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Abstract This paper aims to fill in a research gap in the effects of bank competition on corporate innovation. 
In addition to the evidence on the favorable effects of bank competition on corporate innovation, this paper 
shows novel evidence on the substitution effects of bank competition in a wider region and neighbor-state 
to local bank competition in financing corporate innovation activities. In financing innovation, we show 
‘how local is local’ depends on the operating scope and information transparency of firms. Local banks 
have an information advantage over distant banks in financing local businesses and informationally opaque 
corporate innovation activities. Therefore, improved competition in distant banking markets may have 
limited ability to substitute the favorable effects of local bank competition in facilitating corporate 
innovation activities.  
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1 Introduction  
Given the substantial changes in banking markets after liberalization and deregulation, existing literature 
has identified various correlations among the structures in a setting of cross-regional banking markets (e.g. 
Richards et al. 2008; Michalski and Ors 2012) and the effects of improved bank competition on businesses, 
such as the cost of finance (Rice and Strahan 2010) and corporate innovation (Amore et al. 2013). What is 
little known, however, is how such a cross-regional bank competition since deregulation has contributed to 
corporate finance. With the removal of interstate bank entry barriers since 1990s, the U.S. banking market 
has become more competitive. The entry of out-of-state banks (Rice and Strahan 2010) and the increasing 
borrower-lender distance (Petersen and Rajan 2002) have been found to affect credit conditions in already-
competitive urban areas, making local banks exposed to a greater competition from those banks locating in 
both local and distant markets and to restrict their lending to more proximate borrowers due to an 
information advantage (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004; Hauswald and Marquez 2006). Focusing on the 
relevancy of geographic proximity in banking finance, this paper aims to fill in such a research gap in 
current literature by investigating how bank competition in a wider regional area and neighbor states affects 
corporate innovation in home-state after the passages of deregulations.   
This paper is motivated by the fact that banks always possess a certain degree of market power and 
price accordingly when borrowers are separated from geographically disparate banks. Based on spatial 
pricing discrimination, the traditional spatial competition models formalize the idea that the cost of credit 
for businesses and borrower-lender distance is negatively related (Park and Pennacchi 2009). The 
underlying rationale is that the proximity between a borrower and its lender would increase the costs (e.g. 
transportation) for borrowers to access alternative but distant banks, enabling local banks to gain a certain 
monopoly power in local markets and to charge higher prices on proximate borrowers. In contrast, the 
information asymmetry rationale concerns that proximity may give advantages to closer lenders in 
screening perspective borrowers (Hauswald and Marquez 2006) and monitoring loans (Almazan 2002). In 
the sense, firms would be more likely to receive better loan terms from local banks because the severity of 
the asymmetric information problem may intensify with distance, and distant banks are often not viable 
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substitutes for local banks (Agarwal and Hauswald 2010). This has been evidenced by a significant negative 
association between the firm-bank distance and the likelihood that small firms seek to establish strong and 
long-term banking relationships (Petersen and Rajan 2002; Berger et al. 2005).  
In terms of the relationship between bank competition and corporate innovation, existing literature 
has mainly focused on a local based relationship (e.g. Corgannia et al. 2015), where firms are supposed 
raise capital from local (i.e. home state) banks to finance innovation activities. Whereas, a possible 
substitute effect of neighbor market competition may exist if firms, especially those large and publicly listed 
firms, access a neighbor bank market for finance because of greater availability and/or lower prices. In 
addition, due to the competing conjectures, a research gap exists in terms of the role played by information 
in distant banking. To fill in such a gap, this paper focuses on corporate innovation activities that are 
inherently risky and informationally opaque (Hall and Lerner 2010). If borrower proximity facilitates the 
collection of proprietary information, local banks would play a more important and favorable role in 
financing corporate innovation than distant banks. Therefore, our main propositions are, first, corporate 
innovation, especially those informationally opaque innovation activities, would be less sensitive to the 
structure of distant banking market (e.g. neighbor state) and second, asymmetric access to soft information 
over distance would provide local banks an advantage in information acquisition against distant 
competitors.  
We commence our analysis by revisiting the favorable effects of banking market competition on 
corporative innovations by testing the heterogeneous sensitivities of innovation activities to bank 
competition within home-state and in a wider regional area. By employing Panzar-Rosse (1984) H-statistic 
(H henceforth) and consistent with existing literature (Amore et al. 2013; Chava et al. 2013; Cornaggia et 
al. 2015), we show clear evidence on the favorable effect of bank competition on corporate innovation. 
Contributing to banking literature, we also show that home-state bank competition exerts a stronger 
favorable effect than that of regional competition and such variation is economically sizable. For example, 
a 0.1 increase in home-state H would improve the numbers of patents and citations by 20% and 49% 
respectively, while such an improvement of regional H is only 3.5% for patents and 7.95% for citations. 
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Moreover, we show that a greater competition in a wider regional market does not directly affect the 
underline nature and risks of innovation being patented. The unique evidence is in favor of the arguments 
on geographic proximity that physical distance acts as a source of inefficiency in credit markets and incurs 
economic costs for both lenders and borrowers (e.g. Degryse and Ongena 2004).  
This paper also adds value to literature in a spatial analysis of banking market by testing the role 
of bank competition in neighbor states in financing corporate innovation in home state. We provide a more 
nuanced answer to the question that how spatial interdependency on competition may alter the importance 
of local banks on commercial lending. Yet such an effect has been neglected by existing literature due to 
the lack of reliable data. Aiming to fill in this research gap, we follow Bellón (2016) and propose a novel 
testing group to evaluate the substitution effects exercised by bank competition in neighbor states on 
corporate innovation.  
The strategy is based on the overlap between financial and industrial markets (Asker and Ljungqvist 
2010) on the determination of demand for credits in a local bank market. In specific, we propose that firms 
operating over larger geographical areas would be more sensitive to the structure of more than one ‘local’ 
banking market. This is because their non-local industrial competitors are affected by bank competition in 
their own home markets and there have been lower barriers for non-local banks to lend in other markets 
since bank deregulation. We show that the substitution effects of bank competition on corporate innovation 
do exist but for those firms operating in a wider geographic area only. In contrast, firms operating locally 
are not sensitive to bank competition in neighbor states and they reply much more heavily on local bank 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Nanda and Nicholas, 2014), in a corporate innovation setting.  
Due to the inefficiency of banking in screening and monitoring distant borrowers, we further 
investigate the role played by information. Our results show novel evidence that financially constrained 
firms and those innovation activities with a greater degree of proprietary information would benefit a 
stronger favorable effect from local (home-state) bank competition. Compared with informationally opaque 
innovators, informationally more transparent innovators benefit more from bank competition in neighbor 
states. Such a finding confirms the disadvantages of distant banks in information collection and supports 
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the heterogeneity of bank competition effects (Petersen 2004; Stein 2002). It is also consistent with 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) who speculate that greater 
competition from outside lenders might cause local banks to concentrate their lending on proximate 
borrowers for whom they retained an information advantage.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the effects 
of bank market competition on credit availability and, thereby, the corporate innovation. We provide 
background information on bank competition in U.S in Section 3 and describe data, variables and 
identification strategies in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 report the results from empirical analysis and 
robustness tests. We further investigate the effects of asymmetric information in Section 7 and conclude in 
Section 8.  
2 Theoretical Backgrounds 
The roles played by banking market structure have been widely acknowledged (e.g. Berger et al. 2005; 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2006). As a lingering debate, the theoretical predictions have presented both 
positive and negative relationships between banking competition and credit availability for firms and their 
innovation activities. According to the market power hypothesis, corporate innovation would benefit from 
banking market competition because of the improved credit supply (Boot and Thakor 2000), lowered credit 
prices (Black and Strahan 2002), decreased covenant intensity (Lian 2014) and improved bank operating 
efficiency (Benfratello et al. 2008). In contrast, information-based hypothesis proposes that banks in a 
concentrated market would have a stronger motive to acquire private information, e.g. by relationship 
lending, than those in competitive markets because of the free-riding issues (Diamond 1984; Dell’Ariccia 
and Marquez 2004). The credit supply to informationally opaque and financially constrained firms and 
projects, therefore, could be greater in a concentrated banking market where banks subsidize high risk 
borrowers at the beginning of the relationship and extract rent in the future from those who are eventually 
successful (Petersen and Rajan 1995). 
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Building on the seminal paper by Hotelling (1929), a focus on location and spatial interaction in 
competition has recently gained more attention. Such a focus is attributed to the growing interest within 
theoretical economics that moves towards an explicit accounting for the interaction of an economic agent 
with other heterogeneous agents in the system (LeSage 2014). In a banking market, this is especially 
important where banks offer horizontally differentiated products and services. Intuitively, competition 
between banks is inherently spatial as borrowers would have to travel between banks or bank branches to 
complete different transactions, despite the improvement in information processing ( Berger and DeYoung 
2006) and communication technologies (Pana et al. 2015). Hence, economic theories have taken physical 
distance as a source of inefficiency in credit markets, causing economic costs for both banks and borrowers 
(Degryse and Ongena 2004).  
The first channel through which distance may affect the availability and cost of credit for firms is 
transportation costs. Formalized in the context of location, the traditional product differentiation models 
predict a negative relationship between loan prices and the borrower-lender distance. The rationale lies in 
the fact that closer borrowers face higher transportation costs to approach competing banks that are located 
farther away. This allows the lending bank to engage in spatial price discrimination on the basis of the 
physical distance to the borrowing firms (Dell'Ariccia 2001; Petersen and Rajan 2002; Park and Pennacchi 
2009).  
For banks, the total costs of monitoring are also expected to increase with the borrower-lender 
distance, reducing the willingness of banks to extend credits to more distant borrowers (Brevoort and 
Wolken 2009). The increasing monitoring costs may open another window for banks to engage in further 
discriminatory pricing by subsequently passing along such costs to borrowers by setting higher loan rates. 
Empirical evidence has shown that even a stronger bank competition reduces loan prices due to the 
decreased average distances between all possible combinations of firms and neighbor banks (Degryse and 
Ongena 2005), an increase in the number of banks aggravates the adverse selection problem by enabling 
low-quality borrowers to obtain finance (Broecker 1990), leading to a retrenchment towards relationship 
lending (Hauswald and Marquez 2006) and resulting in higher loan rates. Therefore, proximity of the 
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borrower to an alternative (nearest competing) lender is another significant element in the relationship 
between distance and business lending.  
The second rationale refers to information asymmetries as bank lending is an information intensive 
process by which banks collect relevant information from both borrowers and local markets (Wu and Wang 
2000; McKee and Kagan 2017). If the severity of the asymmetric information problem intensifies with 
distance, banks can strategically use their informational advantage to create a threat of adverse selection for 
their rivals, and thus soften competition. Hence, this mechanism concerns the advantage that proximity may 
give local lenders in screening perspective borrowers and monitoring loans, particularly in lending small or 
informationally opaque businesses where banks3  rely more heavily on ‘soft’ information collected through 
multiple interactions with the firms via relationship banking for instance. The relationship lending is 
accumulated over time and therefore is costly to lenders and not easily transferable (Petersen 2004; Stein 
2002). Indeed, the costs of building and sustaining the banking relationship are positively associated with 
the physical distance between the lender and borrower where farther away loan applicants are more likely 
to be credit rationed and lending decisions become less efficient with increasing distance (Carling and 
Lundberg 2005).  
3 Bank Competition in U.S 
The U.S. banking industry has changed dramatically over the past decades in response to a nationwide 
deregulation in banking sector. Coincided with the development of information technology and 
communications, interstate banking deregulation and the ability of bank holding companies (BHCs) to 
operate at a nationwide level have led to a significant consolidation wave in banking industry during late 
1990s and an effective expansion of the banking market (Strahan 2003; Chang 2010; Al-Khasawneh 2013). 
                                                          
3 Bank customers may undertake additional information costs related to searching information about alternative suppliers. These 
searching costs may vary directly with the distance between the customer and financial institutions and the degree of heterogeneity 
in financial services. Providing information to prospective customers can also impose costs on financial institutions in the form of 
advertising or the costs associated with maintaining relationships with brokers or other agents that interact with potential customers 
(Brevoort and Wolken 2009). 
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In spite of the advance of disintermediation, U.S. banking sector has grown in real terms (Berger et al. 
1995) and become more open to competition. The restructuring has raised numerous concerns about the 
conduct and performance of commercial banks and underlined the importance of both localized and multi-
market competition in banking. 
Some advocates of reform claim that the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act (IBBEA) of 1994 has made the operation of banking institutions more efficient in U.S by removing 
barriers to geographic expansion and helped BHCs better diversify their assets and liabilities. One of the 
most important implications, with regard to credit availability, is that fewer restrictions across states can 
improve the scope for geographic diversification, allowing banks to finance more freely across state 
boarders. The consolidation activity has increased the ‘geographical reach’ of banks substantially (Kwast 
et al. 1997; Berger et al. 1999; Brevoort and Hannan 2006). The lowered costs and the much improved 
ability to transmit information almost globally have effectively freed the financial service industry from the 
constraints of time and spaces. These changes have sparked a renewed interest in the fundamental role of 
bank-borrower distance in lending behavior in a less regulated environment.  
For example, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) theoretically model how the extension of credit in 
local markets would be affected by the changes in either the cost advantages of the less-informed banks or 
in the degree of information asymmetries among financial institutions. They propose that a greater 
competition from outside lenders will motivate local banks to reallocate credit towards borrowers from 
whom they possess an information advantage, and encourage local lenders to reduce the distance over 
which they extend credit to businesses. Consistent with this view, Kroszner and Strahan (1999), Petersen 
and Rajan (2002) and Brevoort and Hannan (2006) propose that the proximity between borrowers and 
distant lenders is now less important than in the past. This is because advances in computing and 
communications technology have increased the availability of quantifiable information about potential 
borrowers and reduced the importance of ‘soft’ information, especially in small business lending. All these 
research efforts conclude that the structure changes in the competitive environment might lead local lenders 
to restrict their lending activities to a smaller geographic area. However, this question has not been the 
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subject of extensive empirical study due to the unavailability of data. By using innovation data from 
companies who have access to both local and distant bank markets, this paper aims to evaluate the 
heterogeneous effects of bank competition on corporate innovation. 
4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data collection 
We collect data from various sources. Within a patent-metrics, we collect corporate innovation data from 
National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) patent database (1976-2006) which contains information 
on the patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We exclude patents 
granted to universities, governments and foreign companies who have weak dependency on local banking 
markets. The banking market competition is evaluated at state level for 51 states in U.S. by using bank 
deposit data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The data is based on the values disclosed 
at the end of each fiscal year by commercial, cooperative and saving banks operated in U.S., and we exclude 
Hawaii and Alaska which do not have neighbors when investigating the substitution effects of bank 
competition. Finally, all firm-level information for control variables is collected from COMPUSTAT for 
listed corporations, and state specific control variables are obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of ST. 
Louis and National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). We restrict our data between 1992 and 2004 so 
as to have a full set of information on both patents and banking markets4.   
4.2 Measuring corporate innovation 
Following existing literature (e.g. Amore et al. 2013), we measure corporate innovation by patent-metrics. 
It prevents the problems arising from accounting practices, such as R&D expenditure (Chava et al. 2013), 
and it better represents the output or the commercialization of innovation activities than other measures 
                                                          
4 More recent data on bank market structure are available from FDIC and we find bank market has become less competitive 
(measured by Panzar-Rosse H Statistics) since financial crisis. Upon availability of more recent data on patent, future research 
could look into how financial crisis and reduced bank competition affect corporate innovation. We appreciate an anonymous referee 
for raising this point.  
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(Ciftci and Zhou 2016). In specific, we measure innovation outputs by the number of patents filed by 
company i in state j5 in year t and the number of citations received by the patents to capture the economic 
importance of innovation activities6 (Hall et al. 2001). We also use additional patent-based measures to 
evaluate the underlying risk and nature of corporate innovation activities. First, we make a distinction 
between highly cited (top quartile) patents (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑) and less frequently cited (bottom quartile) patents 
(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑) to measure the underlying risk of particular innovation activities (Chava et al. 2013). Second, 
we measure the nature of a specific patent by the indices of 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. The greater the 
value of 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, the more likely the patent is being drawn upon by a more diverse array of subsequent 
patents. Similarly, a patent would have a greater 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 if it cites a wider array of technology classes 
of patents. All variable constructions are provided in Appendix.   
4.3 Measuring banking market competition and controlling for endogeneity  
To establish the complex causality between the changes in bank competition and corporate innovation, we 
use Panzar-Rosse (1984) H-statistic (H)7 with a long term equilibrium in the main tests and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) in the robustness tests. H has been acknowledged to be superior to other 
competition measures as it is derived from profit-maximizing equilibrium conditions (Shaffer 2004; 
Claessens and Laeven 2005) and it has been widely used to assess banking market competition (Bikker and 
Haff 2002), ranging from 0 (monopolistic market) to 1 (competitive markets). Our measures of bank 
competition at either state or regional level consider all banks operating in a specific state or region, 
including both local banks and those which headquarter in other states. In addition, such measures are built 
on market equilibrium to minimize the interest rate dispersion effects caused by multi-locational nature of 
banks (Barros 1999). 
                                                          
5 We match NBER patent data with COMPUSTAT sample firms by using a bridge file provided by the NBER database in which 
GVKEY is the common identifier. For cases in which the corporate headquarter is different from the assignee state, we use the 
headquarter state of the corporation shown in COMPUSTAT.  
6 We follow existing literature to date patents to the year of application to reflect the signaling effects and weight-average the 
number for three years to mitigate the truncation bias. Please see Appendix, Hall et al. (2001 and 2005) and Cornaggia et al (2015) 
for more detail.  
7 The derivation and equilibrium test of H is not reported but available from authors upon request. 
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Unlike exogenous shocks (e.g. the implementation of IBBEA), bank competition in a local banking 
market could be jointly determined with corporate innovation decisions by unobserved state characteristics. 
To address the possible endogeneity issue8, we apply an instrumental variable approach to overcome the 
endogenous problem and the instrument used is ‘state median Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. The idea relies 
on the fundamental nature of competitive markets where new players enter the market freely and failed 
players exit freely. A market with high regulated bank capital ratio would have a greater ability to build a 
buffer against unexpected losses (e.g. Corbae and D’Erasmo 2014) and such capital regulation directly 
constrains the entry of distant banks into a local market. Thus, a state with higher capital requirements are 
subject to less systemic risks of instability and tend to have limited entry and exit if the incumbent banks 
operate prudently, leading to a lower competitive banking market9. 
To be a valid instrument, we have no reason to believe that performed capital ratio of banks directly 
affects corporate innovation activities. In fact, the Tier 1 ratio measures how well banks are capitalized in 
a particular market and the current Tier 1 ratio in U.S. is based on Basel III and enforced jointly by Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and FDIC. 
Moreover, the required capital for de novo banks varies largely from one state to another though the impacts 
of regulations may be homogeneous. Therefore, Tier 1 ratio is anticipated to be valid instrument10 for H.  
4.4 Additional control variables 
In the regression analysis, we set a vector of corporation and industry characteristics that may affect a 
corporation’s future innovation outputs as control variables. In conjunction with the literature on the 
economics of technological change and industrial organization (e.g. Cohen 1995), competitive position, 
                                                          
8 The existence of endogeneity of local banking market competition is supported by Wu-Hausman F test (p = 0.0632) and Durbin-
Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p = 0.0225) in our empirical analysis. 
9 The correlation between state average H and state median Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio during 1992 to 2004 is – 0.1718 and is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
10 We use median Tier 1 ratio rather than regulatory minimum because banks might be still undercapitalized even they have such 
a ratio above minimum. To test the validity of the instrument, we conduct additional tests to investigate (1) if there is any 
relationship between Tier 1 ratio and innovation, (2) if the implementation of Basal Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision in 1997, on which Tier 1 ratio is based, has any impact on innovation and (3) the robustness of the results by using an 
alternative instrument, tangible capital ratio. Our results, not reported but available on request, show consistent evidence on the 
validity of the instrument (Tier 1 ratio) used. We appreciate two anonymous referees for raising this issue. 
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internal work routines and attitude to learning and communication - in terms of a firm’s riskiness, efficiency 
and pledge ability - are consistently found to be associated with corporate innovative activities (e.g. Herrera 
and Minetti 2007). We expect that there are three key factors determining firms’ innovative behavior. 
Firstly, in accordance with Schumpeterian hypotheses (Schumpeter 1942) and well-established 
literature (e.g. Cohen and Klepper 1996b), the size of the firm and the level of product market concentration 
in which the firm operates are possible determinants of corporate innovation. Considering the role of 
industry factors, firms usually acquire market power because successful innovation or market power 
enables firms to make innovation profitable (Kamien and Schwartz 1982). Secondly, as with the scientific 
opportunity and appropriability theories, corporate profitability and leverage have been found to have a 
strong impact on corporate innovation (e.g. Himmelberg and Petersen 1994; Audretsch 1995) because the 
promotional effect of firms’ profitability on their innovation activities is subject to the technological 
opportunity environment. Thirdly, it is useful to reconsider the Schumpeterian hypothesis in light of the 
fact that industry concentration may occur because of the existing relationship between innovation and 
corporate efficiency (Herrera and Minetti 2007). Therefore, following existing literature (e.g. Aghion et al. 
2005), we control for both firm and state characteristics that may affect corporate innovation outputs, such 
as firm size, age, profitability (ROA), cash holding, growth opportunity (sales and Tobin’s Q), asset 
tangibility, leverage, capital to labor ratio, and industry concentration. At state level, we control for 
coincident index (Crone and Clayton-Matthews 2005) and venture capital ratio which proxy for the time-
variation in the availability of alternative financing sources for corporate innovation11. We winsorize all 
control variables at 1st/99th percentile and variable definitions are provided in Appendix. 
                                                          
11 Apart from venture capital, other nonbank sources of finance may also have impacts on corporate innovation. Our data do not 
allow us to further investigate such impacts and we call for future research to examine the effects of bank-nonbank competition on 
corporate innovation. We appreciate an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
13 
 
 
4.5 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the following analysis with a total of 
32,869 firm-years observations from 49 U.S. contiguous states during 1992 – 2004. On average, each 
sample firm is granted 11 patents which receive a total of 137 citations annually. The local (home-state) 
banking market is monopolistically competitive. H (HHI) ranges from 0.114 (0.012) to 1 (0.551) with an 
average of 0.594 (0.01) and a standard deviation of 0.239 (0.397). The market structure of neighbor state 
and a wider regional area show a similar pattern with monopolistic competition. 
[Table 1 insert here please] 
4.6 Identification strategy and regression specifications 
Due to the limitation of the data, we are not able to match each sample firm with the market power of an 
individual bank, either in local market or distantly, which has financial transactions with the firm. Instead, 
we follow existing literature (e.g. Amore et al. 2013) and test the sensitivity of corporate innovation to the 
structure of local, neighbor and regional bank market by  
   𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑗?̂? + 𝛾1𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+𝜀1𝑖𝑡                                  (1) 
   𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝑟𝑡̂ + 𝛾2𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡    (2) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡      (3)   
where i, t, j, r and k represent company, time, state, region and industry respectively.  𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is 
corporate innovation for company i in state j year t, measured as patents, citations and etc. 𝐻𝑗?̂?  and 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝑟𝑡̂  are the ‘Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio’ instrumented local (home state) and regional bank 
competition and their coefficient, 𝛽, captures the causal effect of H on corporate innovation outcomes. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 
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denotes a vector of firm- and state-level controls. We also control for the aggregate trends in industry, year 
and state12 fixed effects. 
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡13 is the average H of state j’s neighbor states. As locational information always presents 
contiguity (LeSage 1999), empirically, we consider the importance of spatially heterogeneous relationships 
and define the average 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡 on the basis of inverse distance weights W. Given the latitude-longitude 
coordinates of a state, the weights matrix 𝑊 (49 × 49) is as: 
𝑊 =
𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗
𝑙
                                                                                   (4) 
where          
𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗ = {
1
𝑑𝑗𝑙
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑗) 𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑙)
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                       (5) 
and 𝑑𝑗𝑙 stands for the great circle distance between centroids of state j and l. In robustness tests, we use 
alternative binary weights that equal to 1 when state j and l share a common boundary.            
Secondly, we consider the heterogeneous corporate demands for credit. Due to the overlap between 
financial and industrial markets (Asker and Ljungqvist 2010), it is anticipated that the access to cheaper 
finance in a competitive bank market would offer a business a strategic advantage in the product market 
over its competitors in a concentrated bank market, known as indirect competition in banking sector 
(Osborne 1988). Therefore, the geographical span of industrial markets in which firms operate may affect 
their demand for credit. We expect that firms with wider areas of operation, encompassing several banking 
markets, will have a more elastic demand for credit from their local banks, effectively limiting the available 
rent that the local banks can extract and are more sensitive to the product prices offered by their industrial 
                                                          
12 Concerning the potential bias that is caused by multicollinearity, we exclude the state fixed effects from Eq.(1) since 𝐻𝑗𝑡 is 
defined at state × year level. The identification of β1, therefore, is not solely from within-state variation across time (Chava et al., 
2013).  
13 We test the effects of home-state H and neighbour-state H in separate models. This is because the interdependence between 𝐻𝑗𝑡 
and 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡 may cause a potential multicollinearity problem. In addition, the main purpose of the paper is to investigate whether 
commercial lending markets in neighbor states can alter the impacts of localized banks (i.e. substitution effects) rather than the 
spillover of banking competition.  
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competitors located in other states (Bellón 2016). Accordingly, we follow Porter (2003)  and identify sample 
firms in traded industries14 that operate in a wider geographical area are more likely to be affected by 
unobservable heterogeneity in the locations where they are headquartered but the interest rates they face 
are less subject to the exercise of market power by local banks. While, firms that operate in other industries 
that compete against others within one geographical market may be more sensitive to the change of 
conditions of local banking market where they are located. To capture the causal (substitution) effects of 
localized and neighboring banking markets, we estimate the specification as: 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑗?̂? + 𝛽2𝐻𝑗?̂? × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑛 ∑ 𝑍1𝑛,𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾2𝑛 ∑ 𝑍2𝑛,𝑗𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (6)            
𝑙𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽1
′𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝑟𝑡̂ + 𝛽2
′ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝑟𝑡̂ × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2
′ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 +
𝛾1𝑛
′ ∑ 𝑍1𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑛
′ ∑ 𝑍2𝑛,𝑗𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (7)                     
𝑙𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽1
′′𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2
′′𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2
′′𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 +
𝛾1𝑛
′′ ∑ 𝑍1𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑛
′′ ∑ 𝑍2𝑛,𝑗𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (8)                               
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 1 if a sample firm competes in wider geographical markets beyond home-state 
and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 0 if it competes within only one geographically local market 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 The effects of home-state bank competition on corporate innovation 
We start our empirical analysis by examining the effects of bank competition in home states on the quantity 
and quality of corporate innovation, in terms of the numbers of patents obtained by sample firms and the 
number of citations received by the patents (Table 2). For ease of comparison, we firstly report the pooled 
OLS estimates in Models 1 and 6 with cluster standard errors by firms. In Models 2 – 5 and 7 – 10, instead, 
                                                          
14 We only measure two clusters in our estimations. The resource based clusters in Porter (2003) are considered as local industries 
because employment in these industries is located primarily where the needed natural resources are found, although the industries 
somewhat compete with other domestic or international locations. 
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we consider the endogeneity of H by instrumenting H and running 2SLS models. To test the validation of 
our instrument, we perform the first-stage regressions and the estimates are reported separately in Table 2, 
where the estimated coefficient of Tier 1 ratio on H is negative and statistically significant at 1%. In 
addition, the F-statistic of the first-stage regression is large enough with a statistically significant p-value, 
suggesting that Tier 1 ratio is a valid instrument for H in our estimation.  
Table 2 shows consistent evidence with existing literature on the facts that bank competition in 
home-state enhances innovative activities where firms would have better access to bank finance in a more 
competitive market, supporting market power hypothesis (Boot and Thakor 2000; Black and Strahan 2002). 
In addition, supporting our conjecture, Table 2 shows that traded firms, which operate in a much wider 
geographic area, are less sensitive to local bank competition (Models 5 and 10) than other firms operating 
locally. The difference of economic magnitude is significant. For example, a 0.1 increase in 𝐻𝑗𝑡 would 
increase the number of patents (citations) by 19% (47%) for traded firms but 34% (90%) for other firms. 
Such a result is also robust to a grouping approach (Models 3 and 4 on patents and Models 8 and 9 on 
citations).  
[Table 2 insert here please] 
By following the same logic, we further investigate the effects of local bank competition on 
additional four patent-based innovation measures and report the results in Table 3. Table 3 shows that 
consistent with above findings but except for innovation originality, businesses operating in local product 
markets (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 0) enjoy a stronger favorable effect of improved bank competition in home-
state. It also shows that bank competition has a stronger favorable effect on high risk innovation activities 
(LowCited) (Models 2 vs. 4) where the size of coefficient of H is more than 4 times greater for high risk 
innovation (Model 2) than for low risk innovation. Such a result suggests that an increased bank competition 
would supply more credits to firms undertaking high risk innovation activities and the innovation at initial 
and uncertain stage would take more advantages from a greater competition in local banking market. Finally, 
we find that bank competition improves the generality of corporate innovation.  
[Table 3 insert here please] 
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5.2 Regional bank market competition and corporate innovation 
Table 4 presents the regression results of Eq. (2) and (7), examining the effects of regional banking 
competition ( 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝑟𝑡 ) on the level of corporate innovative outputs. To address the potential 
endogeneity of H at a regional level, we follow the same identification strategy and employ regional median 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑡 ) as an instrument. The first stage regression is 
reported in the last column, showing the estimated predictions and validations of the instrument employed.  
Table 4 shows that the coefficients of regional H are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level in all 2SLS estimations, where the dependent variables are the numbers of successful patent 
applications (Model 1 – 3) and citations (Model 4 – 5), respectively. Even though, there is a significant 
drop in the magnitude of the coefficients compared with that of home-state H (Table 2). An increase of 
home-state H by 0.1 would increase patent counts by 20% (Model 2, Table 2) and 49% in citations (Model 
7, Table 2). In contrast, the economic significance of regional H is 3.5% for patent counts (Model 2) and 
7.9% for citations (Model 5). Moreover, the interaction effect between regional H and industrial operations 
turns to be positive and economically significant (Model 3 and 6). This finding suggests that the 
improvement of banking competition within a greater geographical span is more beneficial for those firms 
that serve markets beyond the state in which they are located.  
[Table 4 insert here please] 
In addition, we perform the estimations against the underlying risk of corporate innovation and the 
results are reported in Table 5. Except for the effect on patents’ generality scores (Model 5 and 6), we find 
little evidence in the effects of regional bank competition on the risk and originality of corporate innovation. 
Such evidence implies that bank competition within a wider scope of geographical areas appears to be less 
effective on explaining the nature of innovation patented. It might do because compared with local banks, 
distant banks always have a disadvantage in soft information collection over distance (e.g. Almazan 2002; 
Agarwal and Hauswald 2010).  
[Table 5 insert here please] 
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5.3 Neighbor-state banking market competition and corporate innovation 
Table 6 presents the estimations for Eq. (3) and (8), providing evidence in line with earlier findings on 
regional bank competition. First, it shows an overall favorable effect of bank competition in neighbor states 
on corporate innovation in home state (Models 1 and 5) but with smaller effects, compared with local bank 
competition (Table 2) and Second, our results suggest that such effects are only statistically significant for 
those businesses operating in a wider geographic product market (Models, 2, 4, 6 and 8). In addition, Table 
7 shows little evidence on the effects of neighbor market completion on the nature of corporate innovation, 
in terms of risk, generality and originality. Overall, the results suggest that firms operating locally are not 
sensitive to bank competition of neighbor state and a wider geographic region. Therefore, ‘how local is 
local banking market’ depends on the operating scope of businesses. Compared with local banks, distant 
banks have an information disadvantage in financing informationally opaque corporate innovation activities 
and the magnitude of the favorable effects of bank competition decreases with distance. 
[Table 6 insert here please] 
[Table 7 insert here please] 
6 Robustness Tests and Parallel Trend Tests 
We undertake a rich set of robustness tests and our results are robust to a variety of identifications. First, 
we re-estimate our specifications by using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index15 (HHI) as an alternative proxy for 
bank competition. Table 8 shows consistent results that overall, bank concentration (HHI) of both home-
state market (Panel A) and neighbor state markets (Panel B) have unfavorable effects on corporate 
innovation and the innovation activities of those firms operating in a wider geographic area are more 
sensitive to neighbor state bank competition, confirming that our findings are not subject to the way of how 
                                                          
15 We use the same instrument in estimating HHI and the correlation coefficient of state median Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio with 
HHI is 0.4973 significantly different from zero at a 1% level.  
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banking market structure is measured. Our results are also robust to an alternative measure of neighbor 
market competition with alternative binary weight16.  
[Table 8 insert here please] 
In addition, we restrict the observation period from 1997 only in order to control for the potential 
effects caused by the implementation of IBEEA. The results in Table 9 indicate that our findings are not 
affected by the time trend and are not correlated with state policy shocks. Given the significant coefficients 
in Model 2 and 4, a 0.1 increase in H in local home state banking markets would increase patents by 14% 
and citations by 53% between 1997 and 2004. Although the evidence consistently suggests a favorable 
effect of local bank competition on corporate innovation, such a favorable effect of home-state H has 
somewhat become smaller since 1997. In contrast, we find that the impacts of regional competition (Model 
5 – 8) and neighbor-state H (Model 9 – 12) have been improved after IBEEA. The finding provides evidence 
on the extended and integrated tendency of so-called local market in U.S. banking industry in a post 
deregulation period.  
[Table 9 insert here please] 
To further validate our earlier results with the parallel trend assumption (consistent estimate of 𝛽3 
in Eq. 6), there should be the same average change in outcome variables (innovation) for both firms 
operating with different scopes. However, such condition is difficult to test directly because the 
counterfactuals are unobservable. To assess whether there are any omitted interactions except for the one 
between bank competition (H) and operating scope (Traded-firm), empirically, we test for systematic 
differences between the subgroups of our samples.  
Table 10 shows that all subgroups in our sample share similar firm characteristics (Panel B). 
However, it could be the case that any systematic differential in investment opportunities between the traded 
and local firms might account for any empirical results, although all those important factors that may affect 
a corporation’s innovation outputs have been parametrically controlled in the baseline specifications. To 
                                                          
16 Results are not reported but available from the authors on request. 
20 
 
ascertain whether such difference constitutes a problem for the robustness of our inferences, we group 
samples according to firm size, age and R&D efficiency that are critical to reflect firms’ information opacity, 
bargaining power and probability of success in innovation (e.g. Cohen and Klepper 1996a; Hirshleifer et 
al. 2013). Fitting the same model with the baselines (Eq. 6) for each subsample, the results17 show consistent 
favorable effects of local bank competition on corporate innovation in various subgroups. Therefore, our 
results still hold even if systematic different investment opportunities exist.  
[Table 10 insert here please] 
7 Information Effects 
Existing banking literature has proposed that proximate borrowers would receive better loan terms from 
local banks because the severity of the asymmetric information problem may intensify with physical 
distance (e.g. Degryse and Ongena 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald 2010). This is probably more pronounced 
for distant banks to finance informationally opaque corporate innovation activities. Above analysis has 
shown consistent evidence that home-state bank competition improves corporate innovation, but one may 
concern that such a favorable effect may vary over the degree of business financial constraints and 
information asymmetries.  
We expect that the positive home-state bank competition effects on innovation would be stronger 
for informationally opaque firms and those financially constrained firms. In order to test the conjecture, we 
group the sample firms according to their Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index and patent type distribution, as 
proxies for financial constraints and the level of information asymmetries at firm level, respectively. In 
light of the innovation literature, a greater information specialization poses a problem for the innovative 
firms when they come to terminating or initiating a banking relationship with banks, so that information 
differentiation captures the degree of specialization in relationship building (Boot and Thakor, 2000). If 
firms with intensive proprietary information cannot switch banks easily even if the rival banks from more 
                                                          
17 The estimated results of subsamples are not reported but available from authors on request.  
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competitive markets tend to reduce loan prices, local banks may have advantages to extract information 
rents in the range of switching costs and the higher the degree of information specialization, the greater the 
rent a bank would create from information advantage.  
We re-run Eq. (6) on sample firms with either low or high Kaplan-Zingales index and dispersed or 
concentrated patent type distribution. Table 11 shows that, first, our earlier results on the favorable effects 
of bank competition and their heterogeneity over business operation scope still hold. In addition, consistent 
with our expectation, the innovation activities, carried out by financially constrained firms (high Kaplan-
Zingales index) and by those with more concentrated patent type distributions, would benefit more strongly 
from increased home-state bank competition.  
[Table 11 insert here please] 
Following a similar logic, we examine the effects of neighbor state bank competition on corporate 
innovation (Table 12) and show that the favorable effects of neighbor state bank competition on corporate 
innovation are only statistically significant for those firms operating widely (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 1) but 
insignificant for those operating locally, supporting our conjecture on the disadvantages in information 
collection for distant banks. 
[Table 12 insert here please] 
8 Conclusion 
This paper aims to complement the existing literature on bank competition and corporate innovation. 
Consistent with literature (e.g. Chava et al. 2013), we show evidence on the favorable effects of bank 
competition on corporate innovation, supporting market power hypothesis. In addition, our work 
contributes to knowledge by providing novel evidence on the information advantages local banks possess 
where locally operating firms benefit more from home-state bank competition than that in a wider region 
or in neighbor-states. 
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Overall, our evidence lends support to the notion that the impacts of banking market competition 
would be different across borrowers characterized by different degrees of asymmetric information, financial 
constraints and operating scope. The more pronounced impacts on informationally opaque firms suggest 
that local banking competition plays a more important role in financing the innovation activities of local 
firms, in line with the propositions by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Nanda and Nicholas (2014). We show 
that the substitution effects of bank competition do exist but are only significant for those firms operating 
widely. Such a substitution effect is not important for informationally opaque firms due to the inefficiencies 
in credit supply of distant banks. This can be attributed to the fact that the information provided by those 
opaque firms to their lenders cannot be transferred easily to distant lenders (Petersen 2004; Stein 2002). As 
such, distant banks generally face a higher degree of information asymmetries compared with local banks, 
reducing their willingness to extend credit to distant borrowers. Our empirical evidence on bank 
competition, therefore, suggests that ‘how local is local’ depends on the operating scope and information 
transparency of corporate borrowers. 
Our results also offer two important implications. First, consistent to existing empirical evidence, 
our results show clear evidence on the favorable effects of bank competition on corporate innovation, not 
only locally at home state but overall in a much wider region. Therefore, bank competition should be 
encouraged by policy makers by removing barriers for lenders to enter a new regional market and for 
borrowers to access finance from a wider physical area. This would enable businesses to compete not only 
locally but also more widely with competitors in other regions. Second, the more pronounced effect of local 
banking competition on stimulating innovation highlights the important role played by local bank market. 
Their bank managers are encouraged to develop stronger banking relationships with local businesses to 
sustain their competitive advantages in information acquisition against external competitors. 
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Appendix: Variables construction 
Innovation variables: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of one plus company i’s total number of successful patents filed in 
years t, where the aggregated counts are adjusted by using the ‘weight factors’ computed from the 
application-grant empirical distribution and averaging the number of patents within three years (year t to 
t+2). 
𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of one plus company i’s total number of citations received of its 
patents filed in years t, where the number of citations are corrected for truncation (Hall et al., 2001, 2005) 
and averaging within three years (year t to t+2). 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of the number of patents applied by company i in state j, year t, 
whose citations are above the 75th percentile of year t’s citation distribution in state j. 
𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of the number of patents applied by company i in state j, year t, 
whose citations are below the 25th percentile of year t’s citation distribution in state j. 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡: An index equals to 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑙
2𝑛𝑘
𝑘 , where 𝑠𝑘𝑙
2  denotes the percentage of citations received 
by a patent k that belongs to the patent technology class l out of 𝑛𝑘 patent classes (Hall et al., 2001). It 
ranges between 0 and 1, and the higher a patent’s generality score, the more that the patent is being drawn 
upon by a more diverse array of subsequent patents. In the analysis, we take an average value for all patents 
generated by the company i in year t. For companies that generate no patents in a year, the index are 
undefined and therefore treated as missing. 
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡: An index equals to 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑙
2𝑛𝑘
𝑘 , where 𝑠𝑘𝑙
2  denotes the percentage of citations made by 
a patent k that belongs to the patent technology class l out of 𝑛𝑘 patent classes (Hall et al., 2001). It is 
bounded between 0 and 1, and the higher a patent’s originality score, the more the patent draws upon a 
diverse array of existing knowledge. In the analysis, we take an average value for all patents generated by 
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the company i in year t. For companies that generate no patents in a year, the index are undefined and 
therefore treated as missing. 
 
Banking market competition variables: 
𝐻𝑗𝑡: Panzar-Rosse (1984) H-statistic of the banking market in state j year t, which is estimated by the 
sum of the elasticity of total revenue with respect to three inputs prices used by banks, which are the labor, 
funds and physical capital, ranging from 0 to 1. The detailed derivation is available upon request from the 
authors. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝑟𝑡: Panzar-Rosse (1984) H-statistic of the banking market in region r year t. The division of 
region areas follows the U.S. Census Bureau definitions, including New England, Mid-Atlantic, East North 
Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain and Pacific 
(http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf). 
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡 : Spatially average weighted Panzar-Rosse (1984) H-statistic of state j’s K number of 
neighbor states in year t. Given the latitude-longitude coordinates of a state, in specific, the weights matrix 
𝑊 (49 × 49) is measured by 𝑊 =
𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗
𝑙
, where 𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗ =
1
𝑑𝑗𝑙
 if 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑗) 𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑙). And in the 
robustness test, we measure 𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗ = 1 if 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑗) 𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑙). 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑟𝑡): Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the sum of squared share of deposits for each 
branch in state j (region r) year t. We take weighted averages across markets for banking institutions in 
multiple local markets using the proportions of total deposits as the weights. 
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡: Spatially average weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of banking concentration of 
state j’s K number of neighbor states in year t, measured on the bases of inverse distance weights matrix 𝑊 
(49 × 49) =
𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗
𝑙
, where 𝑤𝑗𝑙
∗ =
1
𝑑𝑗𝑙
 if 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑗) 𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐾(𝑙).  
 
Other control variables: 
30 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖: The measure of the geographical span of industrial competition. It takes value of one 
if a sample firm competes beyond one geographical product market and zero if it competes within only one 
geographical market. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of company i measured at the end of fiscal 
year t. 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of (1+age), where age is the number of years that the company i has been in 
COMPUSTAT. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡: EBITDA to total assets for company i in year t. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡: Cash and marketable securities to total assets for company i in year t. 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡: Ratio of net property, plants and equipment (PPE) to total assets for company i 
in year t. 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 : Natural logarithm of the ratio for company i in year t, where capital is 
represented by property, plants and equipment (PPE), and labor is the total number of employees. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡: Debt to equity ratio of company i in year t. 
𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡: Natural logarithm of the total sales of company i year t. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑡: Equals to the total market value of company i in year t divided by its total assets value. 
According to Duchin et al. (2010), the market value = Total assets + Market value of common equity – 
Common equity – Deferred taxes. The total assets value = 0.9 × Book value of assets + 0.1 × Market value 
of assets. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the industry in which company i operates, 
computed as the sum of squared market share of all firms, based on sales, in a given three-digit SIC industry 
in year t. 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗𝑡−1: An index used to control for regional economic trend, which combines data 
on nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, unemployment rate, and wage 
and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index. 
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𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡: Ratio of total venture capital investments to total investment in state j year t. 
𝐾𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑎_𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥: A measure for the financial constraints at firm-level (Kaplan-Zingales, 1997) 
which is equal to [– 1.002 × Cash flow + 0.283 × Tobin’s Q + 3.319 × Debt – 39.368 × Dividends – 1.315 
× Cash]. 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡: A measure of specialized information of the innovation being patented. Based 
on 6 different patent categories defined by Hall et al. (2001), the innovative activity is considered as 
‘concentrated’ if the kurtosis value of the empirical distribution of patents produced by company i in year 
t among different categories is greater than 3, otherwise is defined as ‘dispersed’.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕  32,869 11 76 0 3769 
𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕  32,869 137 922 0 42339 
𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕 7,995 11 45 1 1207 
𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕  5,889 10 27 0 566 
𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 15,799 0.373 0.291 0 1 
𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 15,799 0.526 0.243 0 1 
H-statistic (𝑯𝒋𝒕) 32,869 0.594 0.239 0.114 1.000 
HHI (𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒋𝒕) 28,513 0.010 0.397 0.012 0.551 
Average H-statistics of Neighboring state (𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕) 32,869 0.647 0.169 0.187 0.968 
Distance weighted average H-statistics of Neighboring state (𝑾𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕) 32,869 0.644 0.252 0.085 1 
Regional H-statistic (𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕) 32,481 0.554 0.229 0.124 0.968 
Size 31,789 5.188 2.597 -6.908 13.920 
Age 31,098 2.348 1.048 0 4.007 
ROA 31,593 -0.042 0.454 -2.708 0.407 
Cash holding 31,774 0.227 0.258 -0.008 1 
Asset tangibility 31,726 0.241 0.193 0 1 
Capital to labor ratio 29,432 4.321 1.053 -1.792 11.598 
Leverage 30,440 0.011 0.040 0 1.450 
Ln(Sales) 30,927 4.963 2.813 -6.908 12.564 
Tobin’s Q 32,869 1.325 8.963 -229.930 1082.041 
Product market HHI 32,798 0.014 0.024 0.007 0.404 
Coincident Index 32,842 124.853 15.954 92.600 203.120 
Venture capital ratio 32,727 3.267 7.436 0 52.302 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the empirical analysis. The samples collected are from 1992 to 2004 in 49 states 
(include District of Columbia). ‘ln’ stands for natural log value. The detailed description of all variables are shown in Appendix and the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the estimation of H-statistics are not reported but available from the authors on request. 
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Table 2 The Impacts of State Banking Market Competition on the Level of Corporate Innovation  
Dependent variable 𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕  𝑯𝒋𝒕 
 OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  
First stage 
  
All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
Traded 
(3) 
Local 
(4) 
Interaction 
(5) 
 
All 
(6) 
All 
(7) 
Traded 
(8) 
Local 
(9) 
Interaction 
(10) 
 
𝑻𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝟏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒋𝒕             -0.200*** 
             (0.006) 
𝑯𝒋𝒕 0.028 1.801*** 1.783*** 4.198*** 2.912***  0.203*** 4.001*** 3.958*** 8.281*** 6.425***   
 (0.033) (0.196) (0.199) (1.435) (0.581)  (0.060) (0.352) (0.354) (2.796) (1.192)   
𝑯𝒋𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊     -1.177**      -2.566**   
     (0.559)      (1.152)   
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊     0.848**      1.743**   
     (0.330)      (0.679)   
Size 0.215*** 0.222*** 0.240*** 0.100*** 0.222***  0.349*** 0.364*** 0.391*** 0.184*** 0.364***   
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.007)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.062) (0.014)   
Age 0.071*** 0.082*** 0.097*** -0.040 0.085***  0.036*** 0.060*** 0.084*** -0.136** 0.064***   
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.035) (0.008)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.068) (0.015)   
ROA -0.349*** -0.348*** -0.376*** -0.079 -0.345***  -0.478*** -0.476*** -0.527*** -0.018 -0.470***   
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.070) (0.017)  (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.149) (0.035)   
Cash holding 0.589*** 0.556*** 0.584*** 0.035 0.553***  1.125*** 1.053*** 1.102*** 0.358 1.050***   
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.143) (0.034)  (0.060) (0.065) (0.069) (0.283) (0.065)   
Asset tangibility -0.551*** -0.611*** -0.554*** -0.746*** -0.586***  -0.824*** -0.954*** -0.848*** -
1.207*** 
-0.916***   
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.058) (0.171) (0.054)  (0.089) (0.096) (0.106) (0.316) (0.099)   
Capital to labour ratio 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.087*** 0.156*** 0.103***  0.134*** 0.134*** 0.092*** 0.278*** 0.129***   
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.032) (0.010)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.060) (0.018)   
Leverage -0.503*** -0.321* -0.234 -0.278 -0.320*  -0.913*** -0.522* -0.495 0.497 -0.519*   
 (0.170) (0.172) (0.182) (0.649) (0.173)  (0.290) (0.308) (0.316) (1.355) (0.311)   
Ln(Sales) 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.011 0.046***  0.080*** 0.061*** 0.061*** -0.029 0.060***   
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.057) (0.014)   
Tobin’s Q 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.001 0.010***  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** -0.003 0.018***   
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)   
Product market HHI 0.469*** 0.399** 0.442** 0.173 0.390**  1.346*** 1.197*** 1.416*** 0.743 1.165***   
 (0.147) (0.158) (0.185) (0.461) (0.164)  (0.273) (0.301) (0.350) (0.899) (0.314)   
Product market HHI2 -0.745* -0.439 -0.578 0.066 -0.312  -2.593*** -1.937*** -3.143*** -0.833 -1.638**   
 (0.415) (0.429) (0.521) (1.006) (0.460)  (0.659) (0.728) (1.040) (1.859) (0.814)   
Coincident Index -0.000 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.020** -0.009***  0.003* -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.040** -0.015***   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002)   
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Venture Capital 0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.008* -0.001  0.009*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)   
Other controls             Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 26,816 26,816 24,724 2,092 26,816  26,816 26,816 24,724 2,092 26,816  26,974 
R-squared 0.3563 0.2885 0.3007 0.1534 0.2814  0.3447 0.2453 0.2581 0.0616 0.2347  0.4418 
F-statistic 262.16*** 240.40*** 232.25*** 11.63*** 222.93***  423.68*** 355.49*** 347.24*** 9.74*** 325.17***  1518.21*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) specified by Eq. (1) (Model 1 – 3 and 6 – 8) and Eq. (6) (Model 5 and 10), where dependent variables 
are the number of patents and citations being filed by firms respectively. Models employed are pooled OLS with standard robustness errors (Models 1 and 6) and 
instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS) (Models 2 – 5 and 7 – 10). The instrument used is state median Tier 1 risk-based ratio. In specific, Model 3 and 8 report 
the estimations for the subsample firms that operate over larger geographical areas (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 1). Model 4 and 9 show the estimations for the subsample firms 
whose markets are confined to a single banking market (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 0). All estimations control for industry and year fixed effects. All models include full set of 
control variables. The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is rejected.  
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 Table 3 The Impacts of State Banking Market Competition on the Nature and Risk of Corporate Innovation 
Dependent variable 𝒍𝒏(𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕  𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕  𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
𝑯𝒋𝒕 1.241*** 0.715***  1.040*** 0.161***  0.348*** 0.065***  -0.076 -0.013 
 (0.359) (0.050)  (0.345) (0.042)  (0.068) (0.009)  (0.062) (0.009) 
𝑯𝒋𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  -0.631***   -0.067**   -0.033***   0.006 
  (0.040)   (0.029)   (0.007)   (0.006) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
 0.403***   0.655***   0.190***   -0.064 
  (0.025)   (0.181)   (0.044)   (0.041) 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,032 5,032  6,794 6,794  13,324 13,324  13,324 13,324 
R-squared 0.3373 0.4050  0.2914 0.3150  0.2086 0.2547  0.0180 0.0208 
F-statistic 102.21*** 91.88***  58.85*** 56.18***  153.08*** 159.42***  6.91*** 6.74*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) specified by Eq. (1) (Model 1, 3, 5 and 7) and Eq. (6) (Model 2, 4, 6 and 8), where 
dependent variables are the underlying risks and nature of innovation. Specifically, 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡  (𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡) is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the total number of patents granted by companies in state j in year t that are in the top (bottom) quartile of year t’s citation distribution. 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  
(𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) is an index measures the percentage of citations received (made) by a patent that belong to a wide range of technology fields. All 
specifications are estimated by employing instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS). The instrument used is state median Tier 1 risk-based ratio. All 
estimations control for industry and year fixed effects. All models include full set of control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 4 The Impacts of Regional Banking Market Competition on the Level of Corporate Innovation  
Dependent variable 𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕  𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕 
 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
 
OLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
 First stage 
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑻𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝟏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒓𝒕 
        -0.141*** 
         (0.016) 
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕 0.025 0.345*** 0.311***  0.047 0.756*** 0.727***   
 (0.058) (0.080) (0.068)  (0.103) (0.150) (0.120)   
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
  0.024***    0.045**   
   (0.009)    (0.018)   
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
  0.054    0.049   
   (0.056)    (0.108)   
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Other controls         Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 26,491 26,491 26,816  26,491 26,491 26,816  26,496 
R-squared 0.3691 0.2924 0.3710  0.3556 0.2382 0.3572  0.8191 
F-statistic 119.02*** 107.59*** 118.69***  191.21*** 155.81*** 190.43***  3628.27*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) specified by Eq. (2) (Model 1 – 2 and 4 – 5) and Eq. (7) (Model 3 and 6), where 
dependent variables are the number of patents and citations being filed by firms respectively. Models employed are pooled OLS with standard robustness 
errors (Models 1 and 4) and instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS) (Models 2 – 3 and 5 – 6). The instrument used is regional median Tier 1 risk-
based ratio. All estimations control for industry, year and state fixed effects. All models include full set of control variables and the results are available 
on request from the authors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 Table 5 The Impacts of Regional Banking Market Competition on the Nature and Risk of Corporate Innovation 
Dependent variable 𝒍𝒏(𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕  𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕  𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕 0.112 0.128  -0.171 -0.095  0.054* 0.056**  -0.052 -0.047 
 (0.193) (0.170)  (0.145) (0.130)  (0.031) (0.026)  (0.032) (0.029) 
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
 0.015   -0.008   0.004   -0.003 
  (0.029)   (0.020)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
 0.245   0.265**   0.013   -0.046 
  (0.174)   (0.128)   (0.032)   (0.031) 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 4,951 5,032  6,698 6,794  13,156 13,324  13,156 13,324 
R-squared 0.3986 0.4041  0.3200 0.3438  0.2302 0.2586  0.0301 0.0307 
F-statistic 89.57*** 41.97***  89.39*** 43.96***  69.60*** 74.27***  4.88*** 5.17*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) specified by Eq. (2) (Model 1, 3, 5 and 7) and Eq. (7) (Model 2, 4, 6 and 8), where dependent 
variables are the underlying risks and nature of innovation. Specifically, 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡  (𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of 
patents granted by companies in state j in year t that are in the top (bottom) quartile of year t’s citation distribution. 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  (𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) is an index 
measures the percentage of citations received (made) by a patent that belong to a wide range of technology fields. All specifications are estimated by employing 
instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS). The instrument used is regional median Tier 1 risk-based ratio. All estimations control for industry, year and state 
fixed effects. All models include full set of control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
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Table 6 The Impacts of Banking Market Competition in Neighboring States on the Level of Corporate Innovation  
Dependent variable  𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 
  
All 
(1) 
Traded 
(2) 
Local 
(3) 
Interaction 
(4) 
 
All 
(5) 
Traded 
(6) 
Local 
(7) 
Interaction 
(8) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕 0.226*** 0.254*** -0.028 0.016  0.242* 0.278** -0.015 -0.426 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.145) (0.141)  (0.125) (0.129) (0.336) (0.299) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊    0.232*     0.736** 
    (0.141)     (0.296) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊    0.138***     0.155** 
    (0.031)     (0.064) 
Control vairables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,816 24,724 2,092 26,816  26,816 24,724 2,092 26,816 
R-squared 0.3697 0.3782 0.3563 0.3706  0.3555 0.3643 0.3189 0.3564 
F-statistic 120.47*** 118.64*** 17.01*** 117.93***  192.93*** 189.08*** 37.67*** 188.85*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) specified by Eq. (3) (Model 1 – 3 and 5 – 7) and Eq. (8) (Model 4 and 8), 
where dependent variables are the number of patents and citations being filed by firms respectively. 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡  is distance weighted average H 
value for state j’s all contiguous neighbors. Models employed are all pooled OLS with standard robustness errors. In specific, Model 2 and 6 
report the estimations for the subsample firms that operate over larger geographical areas (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 1). Model 3 and 7 show the 
estimations for the subsample firms whose markets are confined to a single banking market (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 = 0). All estimations control for 
industry, year and state fixed effects. All models include full set of control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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 Table 7 The Impacts of Banking Market Competition in Neighboring States on the Nature and Risk of Corporate Innovation 
Dependent variable 𝒍𝒏(𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕  𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕  𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕 0.138 0.183  0.088 0.108  0.011 0.006  -0.028 -0.014 
 (0.131) (0.641)  (0.117) (0.090)  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.021) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  0.223   0.038   0.040*   -0.004 
  (0.629)   (0.072)   (0.022)   (0.020) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  0.202*   0.167*   0.027   0.004 
  (0.120)   (0.094)   (0.025)   (0.023) 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,032 5,032  6,794 6,794  13,324 13,324  13,324 13,324 
R-squared 0.4023 0.4048  0.3429 0.3444  0.2584 0.2586  0.0302 0.0305 
F-statistic 42.73*** 42.10***  44.92*** 44.07***  75.99*** 56.32***  5.14*** 5.09*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) specified by Eq. (3) (Model 1, 3, 5 and 7) and Eq. (8) (Model 2, 4, 6 and 8), where dependent 
variables are the underlying risks and nature of innovation. Specifically, 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 (𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number 
of patents granted by companies in state j in year t that are in the top (bottom) quartile of year t’s citation distribution. 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  (𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) is an index 
measures the percentage of citations received (made) by a patent that belong to a wide range of technology fields. 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡  is distance weighted average H value 
for state j’s all contiguous neighbors. All specifications are estimated by employing pooled OLS with standard robustness errors. All models include full set of 
control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 8 Robustness Tests for the Impacts of State Banking Market Competition on Corporate Innovation: Alternative Banking Competition Measure 
Panel A  𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑳𝒐𝒘𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒔)𝒊𝒕 𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 𝑶𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 -1.197*** -1.354*** -2.692*** -2.890*** -0.816*** -0.680*** -0.245*** 0.057 
 (0.129) (0.132) (0.227) (0.231) (0.236) (0.234) (0.090) (0.083) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖  0.222***  0.234*** 0.217*** 0.142** 0.019 -0.051 
  (0.028)  (0.052) (0.068) (0.060) (0.806) (0.743) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 
 0.026  0.137** 0.186** 0.167** -0.007 -0.023 
  (0.031)  (0.061) (0.085) (0.081) (0.076) (0.069) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,816 26,816 26,816 26,816 5,032 6,794 13,324 13,324 
R-squared 0.3584 0.3607 0.3479 0.3493 0.3767 0.3151 0.2530 0.0207 
F-statistic 263.44*** 253.62*** 427.22*** 410.12*** 81.59*** 56.26*** 156.85*** 6.72*** 
Panel B         
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 -0.448** -0.226 -0.636* -0.286 -0.486 -0.122 -0.010 0.012 
 (0.197) (0.203) (0.378) (0.388) (0.979) (0.606) (0.050) (0.105) 
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 
 -0.584***  -0.795*** -0.782 -0.082 -0.037** 0.032 
  (0.137)  (0.240) (0.969) (0.053) (0.016) (0.041) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 
 0.222***  0.327*** 0.436*** 0.180** 0.012 -0.017 
  (0.029)  (0.057) (0.113) (0.084) (0.021) (0.021) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,374 23,374 23,374 23,374 4,103 5,799 11,505 11,505 
R-squared 0.3799 0.3712 0.3630 0.3639 0.4072 0.3053 0.2475 0.027 
F-statistic 109.11*** 106.78*** 181.94*** 177.84*** 35.91*** 38.46*** 68.75*** 4.77*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) for robustness tests employing Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as the alternative proxy for measuring 
the level of banking market competition. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of patent and citations,  patents in the bottom and top 
quartile of citation distributions, and the percentage of citations received (made) by a patent that belong to a wide range of technology fields respectively. Models employed 
are instrumented two-stage least squares. The instrument used is state median Tier 1 risk-based ratio. All estimations control for industry and year fixed effects. All models 
include full set of control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 9 Robustness Tests for the Impacts of Banking Market Competition on the Level of Corporate Innovation between 1997 and 2004 
 Home-state Banking Market Competition  Neighbor-state Banking Market Competition Regional Banking Market Competition 
Dependent variable  𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕 𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
𝑻𝒊𝒆𝒓 𝟏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒋𝒕 0.744*** 
(0.161) 
1.292*** 
(0.499) 
2.145*** 
(0.303) 
4.275*** 
(1.139) 
        
𝑯𝒋𝒕  -0.576 
(0.497) 
 -2.252** 
(1.130) 
        
𝑯𝒋𝒕 × 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  .500 
(0.314) 
 1.591** 
(0.712) 
        
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊     0.308*** 
(0.045) 
-0.206** 
(0.100) 
0.650*** 
(0.085) 
0.093 
(0.068) 
    
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕
× 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
     0.559*** 
(0.099) 
 0.849*** 
(0.078) 
    
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊      0.240*** 
(0.075) 
 0.336*** 
(0.117) 
    
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕         0.369*** 
(0.112) 
0.366*** 
(0.113) 
0.761*** 
(0.206) 
0.747*** 
(0.209) 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝑯𝒓𝒕
× 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
         0. 45*** 
(0.010) 
 0. 74*** 
(0.022) 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊          -0.108 
(0.067) 
 -0.210 
(0.139) Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 15,104 
R-squared 0.3468 0.345 0.351 0.344 0.3689 0.3706 0.3861 0.3948 0.3675 0.3690 0.3844 0.3854 
F-statistic 175.10*** 161.8*** 312.2*** 281.8*** 72.44*** 71.30*** 133.00*** 134.99*** 72.56*** 71.41*** 133.08*** 130.77*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) for robustness tests for all specifications by restricting sample between 1997 and 2004, where dependent 
variables are the number of patents and citations being filed by firms respectively. Model 1 – 4 measures the impacts of home state banking market competition by employing 
instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS). The instrument used is state median Tier 1 risk-based ratio. Model 5 – 8 display the effects of banking competition in neighboring 
state by using pooled OLS with standard robustness errors. 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐻𝑗𝑡  is distance weighted average H value for state j’s all contiguous neighbors. Model 9 – 12 estimate 
regional banking market effects. The models employed are instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS) by using regional median Tier 1 risk-based ratio as the instrument. All 
estimations of neighboring and regional effects control for industry, year and state fixed effects, while the models of state effects only include industry and year fixed effects 
because H is derived from state-specific reduced-form revenue equation. All models include full set of control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 10 Comparisons between Local and Traded Firms 
Panel A: Corporate Innovation Measures 
 Relative lower local banking competition   Relative higher local banking competition  
 local firms traded firms    local firms traded firms   
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛1 𝛿1 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛2 𝛿2 Difference t-statistic  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛3 𝛿3 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛4 𝛿4 Difference t-statistic 
Number of patents 4.249 1.024 11.279 0.689 7.030 3.1874***  7.878 2.109 11.043 0.621 3.165 1.4914 
Number of citations 54.470 10.682 137.598 7.708 83.127 3.3739***  90.459 25.164 152.285 8.598 61.826 2.1282** 
1st quartile cited patents 6.269 1.123 11.829 0.873 5.561 1.5928*  12.308 2.962 10.639 0.575 -1.669 -0.6174 
4th quartile cited patents 12.574 3.477 8.786 0.483 -3.787 -1.6490*  7.791 2.150 10.041 0.518 2.250 0.9902 
Panel B: Key Firm Characteristics 
 Relative lower local bank competition  Relative higher local bank competition    
 local firms  traded firms  local firms  traded firms    
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛1 𝛿1 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛2 𝛿2  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛1 𝛿1 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛2 𝛿2  
Difference-in-
Differences 
t-statistic 
Size 6.073 3.049  5.085 2.558  6.064 3.051  5.122 2.504  0.046 1.6684 
Age 2.493 1.040  2.366 1.056  2.457 1.053  2.303 1.035  -0.027 -1.6940* 
ROA -0.047 1.409  -0.084 1.397  -0.032 0.539  -0.137 2.169  0.068 0.8598 
Cash holding 0.159 0.222  0.226 0.256  0.166 0.234  0.242 0.264  0.009 0.1710 
Asset tangibility 0.300 0.249  0.236 0.183  0.299 0.249  0.234 0.189  -0.001 -0.0929 
Capital to labour ratio 4.259 1.340  4.305 1.034  4.268 1.253  4.352 1.019  0.038 1.8861* 
Leverage 0.017 0.052  0.011 0.038  0.016 0.046  0.009 0.039  -0.001 -0.2542 
Sales 5205.68 16278.2  2306.41 9934.121  6080.37 17514.77  2162.31 9350.70  -1018.79 0.5231 
Tobin’s Q 0.811 5.727  1.253 10.642  1.109 6.118  1.491 7.206  -0.06 1.6951* 
Product market HHI 0.039 0.064  0.012 0.011  0.046 0.069  0.012 0.011  -0.007 1.0636 
Note: The table presents the mean and standard deviation of four corporate innovation measures (Panel A) and key firms’ characteristic (Panel B) for the observations pertaining 
to each of the four subgroups and the t-test on the null hypothesis that the measured characteristics between local and traded firms are equality of means. The subsamples 
comprise firms headquartered in states with state-year H below or above spatial lagged neighbouring H, and firms that operate within a single banking market if they compete 
in a local industry or across various banking markets if they compete in traded industries. The last two columns in Panel B show the two-sided t-test of the hypothesis that the 
variation of firm characteristics between competitively and less-competitively local banking market for both firm groups follows a parallel trend (i.e. the mean difference for 
columns ([1] – [3]) – ([2] – [4]) equals zero). The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level for which the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 11 Additional Tests for the Impacts of State Banking Market Competition on the Level of 
Corporate Innovation: The Role of Information 
Dependent variable  𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 
Panel A: Kaplan_Zingales Index 
 Low High  Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑯𝒋𝒕 
1.385*** 
(0.211) 
2.761*** 
(0.730) 
2.787*** 
(0.461) 
4.029*** 
(1.106) 
 
3.249*** 
(0.379) 
6.124*** 
(1.536) 
5.921*** 
(0.839) 
8.220*** 
(2.115) 
𝑯𝒋𝒕
× 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
 
-1.435** 
(0.715) 
 
-1.334 
(0.990) 
  
-3.011** 
(1.511) 
 
-2.459 
(1.900) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  
1.044** 
(0.425) 
 
0.908 
(0.581) 
  
2.048** 
(0.894) 
 
1.638 
(1.115) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,744 15,744 11,072 11,072  15,744 15,744 11,072 11,072 
R-squared 0.5907 0.5866 0.4454 0.4360  0.6598 0.6550 0.5218 0.5135 
F-statistic 170.36*** 158.11*** 80.82*** 73.92***  262.06*** 240.18*** 104.70*** 94.91*** 
Panel B: Patent Types Distribution 
 Dispersed Concentrated  Dispersed Concentrated 
 (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) 
𝑯𝒋𝒕 
1.427*** 
(0.542) 
2.393*** 
(0.371) 
2.117*** 
(0.319) 
3.506*** 
(0.774) 
 
2.656*** 
(0.693) 
3.767*** 
(0.586) 
3.456*** 
(0.488) 
5.096*** 
(1.022) 
  
-2.200*** 
(0.598) 
 
-0.288 
(0.235) 
  
-2.595*** 
(0.816) 
 
-0.317 
(0.398) 
  
1.704*** 
(0.358) 
 
0.337** 
(0.153) 
  
1.971*** 
(0.495) 
 
0.453* 
(0.258) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,875 3,875 9,449 9,449  3,875 3,875 9,449 9,449 
R-squared 0.4341 0.4707 0.2813 0.3705  0.3096 0.4018 0.1738 0.2913 
F-statistic 77.13*** 77.83*** 86.35*** 89.54***  58.29*** 63.33*** 79.59*** 86.23*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) for additional tests for Eq. (6) explaining the heterogeneous 
treatment effects of own-state banking market competition. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of one plus the 
total number of patent. Panel A (Model 1 – 8) examines firms’ financial constraints by using Kaplan-Zingales (1997) Index. 
The ‘High’ (‘Low’) subsamples comprise firms with the index above (below) the across-industry median values, and we 
consider firms in the ‘High’ subsamples to be financially constrained. Panel B (Model 9 – 16) tests the characteristics of 
patent types distribution, in which the sample firms with higher (lower) kurtosis of the empirical distribution of patents among 
6 different categories than 3 in year t are defined to be ‘Concentrated’ (‘Dispersed’). All specifications are estimated by 
employing instrumented two-stage least squares (2SLS). The instrument used is state median Tier 1 risk-based ratio. And all 
estimations in the table include industry and year fixed effects. All models include full set of control variables and the results 
are available on request from the authors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 12 Additional Tests for the Impacts of Banking Market Competition in Neighboring States on the 
Level of Corporate Innovation: The Role of Information 
Dependent variable  𝒍𝒏(𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕)𝒊𝒕  𝒍𝒏(𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 
Panel A: Kaplan_Zingales Index 
 Low High  Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕 
0.239*** 
(0.043) 
0.161*** 
(0.043) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.039) 
 
0.489*** 
(0.076) 
0.254 
(0.213) 
0.129* 
(0.074) 
0.047 
(0.075) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕
× 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
 
0.653*** 
(0.080) 
 
0.284*** 
(0.052) 
  
0.735*** 
(0.101) 
 
0.255 
(0.213) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  
0.214*** 
(0.063) 
 
-0.020 
(0.069) 
  
0.153 
(0.157) 
 
-0.212 
(0.142) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,744 15,744 11,072 11,072  15,744 15,744 11,072 11,072 
R-squared 0.4179 0.4217 0.3090 0.3509  0.4028 0.4036 0.2993 0.3276 
F-statistic 138.82*** 137.59*** 74.49*** 73.35***  130.41*** 127.68*** 67.33*** 66.10*** 
Panel B: Patent Types Distribution 
 Dispersed Concentrated  Dispersed Concentrated 
 (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕 
0.169* 
(0.095) 
0.093 
(0.096) 
0.055 
(0.035) 
0.041 
(0.035) 
 
0.570*** 
(0.193) 
0.023 
(0.124) 
0.272*** 
(0.079) 
0.020 
(0.062) 
𝑵𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉_𝑯𝒋𝒕
× 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊 
 
0.593*** 
(0.163) 
 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
  
0.649*** 
(0.199) 
 
0.266*** 
(0.083) 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅_𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒊  
-0.021 
(0.158) 
 
0.119* 
(0.068) 
  
-0.088 
(0.208) 
 
0.128 
(0.123) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,875 3,875 9,449 9,449  3,875 3,875 9,449 9,449 
R-squared 0.5038 0.5069 0.3248 0.3945  0.4337 0.4348 0.2607 0.3116 
F-statistic 49.40*** 48.76*** 75.71*** 74.42***  37.27*** 36.49*** 52.76*** 51.69*** 
Note: This table reports the results (standard errors in parentheses) for additional tests for Eq. (8) explaining the heterogeneous 
treatment effects of out-of-state banking market competition. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of one plus 
the total number of patent. Panel A (Model 1 – 8) examines firms’ financial constraints by using Kaplan-Zingales (1997) 
Index. The ‘High’ (‘Low’) subsamples comprise firms with the index above (below) the across-industry median values, and 
we consider firms in the ‘High’ subsamples to be financially constrained. Panel B (Model 9 – 16) tests the characteristics of 
patent types distribution, in which the sample firms with higher (lower) kurtosis of the empirical distribution of patents among 
6 different categories than 3 in year t are defined to be ‘Concentrated’ (‘Dispersed’). All specifications are estimated by 
employing pooled OLS with standard robustness errors. And all estimations in the table include industry, year and state fixed 
effects. All models include full set of control variables and the results are available on request from the authors. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
